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ACTIONS IN REM
GEORGE B. FRAASER, JR.
Even though courts have been entertaining actions in rem for cen-
turies, there is still much uncertainty about them. To define actions in
rem is not difficult; they are legal proceedings directed against property
itself in order to reach and dispose of the property or of some interest there-
in. But not all phases of a legal proceeding can be determined from just
a definition. For example, how are actions in rem distinguished from
other types of actions? What is considered property for the purposes of
actions in rem? Can only the title to the property be litigated, or can
other issues be determined in the same action? How are such actions
commenced? What is the effect of decrees in such actions? To answer
these questions resort must be had not only to a definition of actions in
rem but to the basic principles underlying such actions and, as is in-
evitable in legal writing, to cases themselves. This paper proposes to
answer these questions about actions in rem by this method.
I. Nature of Actions In Rem
Actions in rem, being proceedings directly against property, are a mani-
festation of the principle that a state has the power to determine the title,
status, or condition of property within its borders.' But this power may
not be arbitrarily exercised; it is limited by a second principle, which
is, that the interests of persons in property may not be cut off without
attempting to provide such persons notice and an opportunity to be
heard.2 Thus, for a court to act in rem, certain preliminary steps must
be taken. When these have been taken, the court is said to have juris-
diction to act in rem, or jurisdiction in rem.
a. Actions in Rem and Actions in Personam. In discussing actions
in rem it is usual to distinguish them from actions in personam. This dis-
tinction is necessary because the object of an action in rem is property and
the object of an action in personam is a person, and because the steps pre-
liminary to the acquisition of jurisdiction over property are different
from those to be taken when the object of the action is a person.8 How-
ever, the distinction between actions in rem and actions in personam is
1 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 Sup. Ct. 200 (1911); Arndt v. Griggs, 134
U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557 (1890); See RESTATEMENT, CoNF=cT oF LAWS § 98 (1934).
2 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 (1876); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 335 (U. S.
1850) ; See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 6 (1942).8 Thompson v. Steamboat Julius D. Morton, 2 Ohio St. 27, 30 (1853); See Woodruff v.
Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 (1847). To be complete courts should subdivide actions in rem into actions
in tractabilem and actions in intractabilem because the method of acquiring jurisdiction over
tangible property is different from that of acquiring it over intangible.
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usually overemphasized because the two actions are similar in many
respects. The same form might be used, the same issues might be liti-
gated and the same relief might be given in actions in rem as in ones in
personam.
The form of the proceeding will not always indicate whether it is in
rem or in personam, as an action may be in rem even though a person
may be named in the pleadings as defendant. ". . . the res need not be
personified and made a party defendant, as happens with the ship in the
admiralty.... Personification and naming the res as defendant are mere
symbols, not the essential matter."4
Many issues may be litigated in an action either in rem or in per-
sonam, the choice as to which to use depending largely on what the
court can get jurisdiction of. Thus, title or interests in property may be
determined in actions in personam; but then the court is proceeding
directly against a person, and the effect on the title or status of the prop-
erty is indirect.
The nature of the proceeding does not indicate whether the action is
in rem or in personam. Thus even probate proceedings which are tradi-
tionally classed as in rem, are in personam as to persons over whom the
court exercises jurisdiction.' Similarly, insanity proceedings which are
usually classed as in personam would be in rem if the proceeding were
to appoint a committee for property over which it exercised jurisdic-
tion.7 The important thing is not the classification of the action but
what is the object of the action. Courts may in fact act in rem and in
personam simultaneously when they have acquired jurisdiction over
property and over a person. The resulting decree is then effective both
in rem and in personam.8
To be distinguished from both actions in rem and actions in personam
are actions as to status. They have frequently been included in actions
in rem. However, the U. S. Supreme Court indicated that a distinction
should be made. "The historical view that a proceeding for a divorce
was a proceeding in rem... was rejected by the Haddock case. We like-
wise agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem presented
by this case to label these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit,
however, is not a mere in personam action."9 Thus, a distinction is made
4Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N. E. 812, 814 (1900).
5 Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (U. S. 1810).
6Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343, 353, 62 Sup. Ct. 608, 614 (1942); Loewen-
thall v. Mandell, 125 Fla. 685, 170 So. 169 (1936).
7Re Sal, 59 Wash. 539, 110 Pac. 32 (1910); See McCormick v. Blaine, 345 Ill. 461, 178
N. E. 195, 200 (1931).
8Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343, 353, 62 Sup. Ct. 608, 614 (1942); Glancy v.
Williams, 50 Idaho 109, 293 Pac. 665 (1930).9 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 297, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942).
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between actions over a status and actions in rem because the object of
the action is different, being a status instead of property, and because
the method of acquiring jurisdiction over a status differs from that of
acquiring jurisdiction over property. Courts may, however, exercise
jurisdiction over status and jurisdiction in rem in one proceeding.
Actions for a divorce and for alimony based on jurisdiction over status
and jurisdiction over property of a non-resident spouse are examples of
this.'
b. Issues and Remedies in Actions In Rem. In actions in rem, the
issues litigated do not have to concern the title or status of the property
subject to the court's jurisdiction. This does not mean that there is no
limit to the issues that may be litigated in actions in rem. The issues
must concern the title or status of the res, or be such that their deter-
mination would create a situation that would involve the title to the res.
Thus a liability unconnected with the res can be litigated in an action
in rem because after the liability is established, satisfaction can be ob-
tained from the property under the jurisdiction of the court.11 The
court's power to determine the obligation is incidental to its jurisdic-
tion over property. This permits a plaintiff to litigate a claim against a
person wherever he can find property belonging to that person.
It is believed that courts should limit this power of a claimant to sue
a debtor wherever he can find some of his property. Although this power
is frequently necessary to protect a claimant, it can also be used to
harrass a debtor. The statutes of many states impose some limitations
on claimants by permitting them to sue non-residents by attachment
for only certain types of claims, such as for "actions upon a judgment,
or upon contract, . . . or for the collection of any penalty. ... "" But
the courts should also limit plaintiffs by the use of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. A suit against a non-resident based on attachment
should be permitted only if the obligee is concealing himself or is about
to conceal his assets or is taking some other step that would prevent a
plaintiff from obtaining satisfaction of a judgment or if the jurisdiction
chosen be the domicile of either the obligor or the obligee or the place
where the cause of action arose or the obligation is due. This doctrine
has been used to prevent interstate railroads from being sued in states
where they neither own nor operate a railroad by a plaintiff who does
l0 Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282 (1917); Reed v.
Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N. E. 684 (1929).
1"Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th
1922); see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 723 (1877).
12IDAHO C6D- (1932) § 6-510(2).
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not and did not reside there upon a cause of action which arose else-
where out of a transaction entered into elsewhere.13
Where the determination of a cause of action would not affect the
res, the cause of action cannot be brought in an action in rem. Thus, a
plaintiff cannot litigate his own liabilities in an action in rem, even though
the court has jurisdiction over a res, because the decision, whether favor-
able or unfavorable, would not affect the res but would only reduce the
plaintiff's obligations. In one case a court refused to reform a lease so
as to reduce the rent of a lessee in an action in rem based on jurisdic-
tion over the leased premises, because the title or right to the leased
premises would not be affected by the result. 4 Rights in property created
by contract may be determined in actions in rem if the decree affects
the property,15 but not all issues resulting from contracts concerning
property can be litigated in actions in rem. Also the effect of the hold-
ings on issues that are litigated in actions in rem for the purpose of de-
termining the title or status of property is limited to its effect on the
title or status of the property. As will be discussed under Judgments,
the holding will have no effect on the rights between the parties.
Just as any issues may be litigated in actions in rem if their deter-
mination will affect the title or right to possession of the property sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction, so any type of relief may be given in
actions in rem if the relief is appropriate to the issues litigated and will
affect the property which is subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Equitable relief, as specific performance or quiet title, may be granted
in actions in rem because such remedies directly affect the title or status
of property. It has long been recognized that equity may act in rem
as well as in personam.16
Some courts claim that it is an inherent power of equity to affect the
title to property in action in rem,l7 but others act only when specifically
given that power by statute.'8 Statutes granting equity courts power to
affect titles in rem actions are of either the vesting or the appointive
type. Where actions of this nature are permitted, it is immaterial whether
real or personal property is involved. 9 Courts proceeding in rem can
even grant injunctions when they directly affect either property or the
13Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 566 (1923).
14 State ex rel. Truitt v. District Court, 44 N: M. 16, 96 P. 2d 710 (1939).
15 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S. C. 496, 151 S. E. 63 (1930); Bush v. Aldrich, I10
S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922 (1918).
16See note 15 supra.
17 Glancey v. Williams, 50 Idaho 109, 293 Pac. 665 (1930); Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts,
67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
1 8See Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N. Y. 261, 162 N. E. 73, 74 (1928).
19 Wait v. Kern River Mining Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 Pac. 98 (1909).
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use of property." Proceedings to abate a public nuisance, such as pro-
ceedings to padlock or restrict the use of a building where there has
been a violation of liquor laws, are of this nature.21
Declaratory judgments may be given in actions in rem if the court is
to declare the title or status of the property which is the object of the
action.
It is stated that a court cannot grant interpleader if it has jurisdic-
tion in rem instead of jurisdiction in personam over both claimants. But
these statements have usually been made in actions where the stake-
holder has tried to set up the decree given in an interpleader action as
a defense to an action in personam 2 If there is property which could
be the res in the action, interpleader would lie to determine the right or
title to the property.13 But the decree as to the title or status of the
property would not prevent a claimant who was not subject to the juris-
diction of the court from holding the stakeholder personally liable.
Money judgments may even be granted in actions in rem when they
are to be satisfied out of the property subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is the usual result when a plaintiff litigates a claim against
a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the court by proceeding against
his property. The judgment, however, cannot bind the obligor per-
sonally.24
c. The Res. It has previously been stated that actions in rem are pro-
ceedings in which the object of the action is property. Any tangible
property, whether movable or immovable, may constitute the res, but
it is not necessary that the property be tangible; it is only necessary
that there be something over which the court could exercise jurisdic-
tion. The res may be a right to or an interest in tangible property,2
or it may be a specific fund such as a trust fund, 26 or it may be an obli-
gation owed by one person to another.2 7
Actions involving obligations owed by one person to another deter-
mine the right of the obligee to the obligation. As to the obligee, the
20See Lyle v. Haskins, 27 Wn. 2d 507, 168 P. 2d 797 (1947); Buchman v. Smith, 137
N. J. Eq. 215, 44 A. 2d 179, 180 (1945). Contra: Gainsburg v. Dodge, 193 Ark. 473, 101
S. W.'2d 178 (1937).21 State v. Brown, 62 Idaho 250, 110 P. 2d 835 (1941).
2 2Cross v. Arnstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160 (1887).
23GIasser v. Wessel, 152 F. 2d 428 (C. C. A. 2d 1945); Union Trust and Hudson County
National Bank v. Kyle, 96 N. J. Eq. 125, 124 Atl. 455 (1924).24 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th
1922); sce Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 723 (1877); Cheshire Natal Bank v. Jaynes
224 Mass. 14, 112 N. E. 500, 501 (1916).25 West End Irrig. Co. v. Garvey, - Colo. -, 184 P. 2d 476 (1947).
26Glasser v. Wessel, 152 F. 2d 428 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
27Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 110 (1923) (bank
deposits) ; Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 147 Pac. 722 (1915) (shares of stock).
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action may be in rem, but as to the obligor, the action must be in per-
sonam as that is the only way a judgment could be obtained that would
subject the obligor to a personal liability. Thus, actions of this type
are really mixed actions, being both in rem and in personam.2"
A plaintiff is not permitted to make his own liabilities or contractual
relationships the res for an action in rem.' To permit this would permit
an obligor to pick his own time and place to litigate his own obligations.
A plaintiff may no more cut off his obligations to another person in an
action in rem than he can obtain a judgment against another person
in an action in rem. "The jurisdictional issue is the same whether the
plaintiff claims or denies liability.""0 The United States Supreme Court
recently stated in a case in which it was discussing the power of one
state to affect an alimony decree of another state, "But we are aware
of no power which the State of domicile of the debtor has to determine
the personal rights of the creditor in the intangible unless the creditor
has been personally served or appears in the proceeding.' This very
thing is done in actions as to status, but the definition of status is limited
so as to exclude contractual relationships and include only relationships
involving a paramount public interest.3 2
Similarly, a plaintiff should not be permitted to garnish himself. The
reasons for not permitting a plaintiff to make his own liabilities the
object of an action in rem apply here because that is the essence of
what a plaintiff is doing if he garnishes himself. Such a proceeding could
not possibly be an adversary proceeding so that there would be no one
to protect the interests of the obligee. Moreover, there is no necessity
for a plaintiff to garnish himself. In the usual garnishment proceeding
a plaintiff must act to obtain the money that the garnishee would other-
wise pay the plaintiff's debtor. If the plaintiff is himself both creditor
and debtor, the necessity of acting is not so urgent; he can wait until
an action is commenced against him. Unfortunately the cases do not
follow this view. About half the states permit a plaintiff to garnish
himself.33 Even more unfortunate is the fact that the cases that refuse
to permit a plaintiff to garnish himself attribute their rulings to the com-
pulsion of statutes. They say the question is one of local law and not one
2 8Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 287, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 110 (1923).2 9Brooklyn v. Insurance Co., 99 U. S. 362 (1878); Densby v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass'n,
78 F. 2d 203 (App. D. C. 1935).
3 9Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin, 88 N. H. 346, 189 Atl. 162, 163 (1937).
SlEstin v. Estin, - U. S. -, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213, 1218 (1948).3 2 RESTATEMENT, CONFLCT OF LAWS § 119, Comment b and c (1934).33 For case denying right of plaintiff to garnish self, see First International Bank v.
Brehmer, 56 N. D. 81, 215 N. W. 918 (1927). For case permitting it, see Norton v. Norton,
43 Ohio St. 509, 3 N. E. 348 (1885). For collection of cases, see 31 A. L. R. 711 (1924), 61
A. L. R. 1458 (1929).
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of due process. 4 However, it would not seem to be due process to permit
a plaintiff to terminate obligations in what is in substance an ex parte
action.
Both tangibles and intangibles may be represented by muniments of
title, such as receipts or certificates. When these instruments are ne-
gotiable and represent chattels or intangibles, they may constitute the
res for an action in rem 5 In that case, the property represented would
not usually constitute the res. 6 There must usually be specific statutory
authority for the instrument to constitute the res as this was not usual
at common law."7 The law of the place where the instrument was issued
determines its effect 8
A will may not be a res so as to constitute a basis for jurisdiction. In
probate proceedings the decedent's estate is the res. 0 This is true whether
the decedent died testate or intestate. Any determination as to dece-
dent's domicile or validity of a will made in probate proceedings by a
court with territorial jurisdiction over some of the estate will be conclu-
sive as to the property located there. But a determination as to domi-
cile40 or validity of a will4 will not be conclusive as to property not
within the jurisdiction of the court, whether realty or personalty, should
other courts wish to reexamine it.
If a will were the object of an action in rem, a decree as to its validity
made at the decedent's domicile would be conclusive everywhere as to
the validity of the will. But such a decree does not have this effect, as is
well recognized if a question concerning realty in another jurisdiction
should arise.42 Such a decree is usually followed elsewhere, however, if
a question concerning decedent's personalty should arise.' But the
decree is not followed because it has any territorial effect. It is followed
because the conflict of laws rule of other states indicates that the law to
be followed in distributing personalty is the law of decedent's domicile.
3 4Jos. Joseph Bros. Co. v. Hoffman, 173 Ala. 568, 56 So. 216 (1911).
3 5Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 2d 1926) (stock certificates); First Trust
Co. v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N. W. 1 (1932) (bonds).3 6Venus Foods v. District Court, - Idaho -, 181 P. 2d 775 (1947). However a state
where the property is may enforce certain interests. See RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT or LAWS§ 50(2) (1934).3 7Sce Trade Bond and Mortgage Co. v. Schwantz, 303 11. App. 165, 24 N. E. 2d 892,
893 (1940). For typical statutes see UqnORM SALES ACT § 39; UNIFOM WAPEOUSE RE-
cEIPTs ACT § 25; UNIFORM BiLLs or LADING AcT § 24; UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 13.
3SMills v. Jacobs, 131 Pa. Super. 469, 200 AtI. 233 (1938), mod. 133 Pa. Super. 231,
4 A. 2d 152 (1939).
3 9See In re Price's Estate, 230 Iowa 1228, 300 N. W. 542, 545 (1941); Simes, The Ad-
ministration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem, 43 MIcyr. L. REv. 675, 697 (1945).
4OBurbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162, 34 Sup. Ct. 299 (1914); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S.
214, 20 Sup. Ct. 603 (1900); Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 20 Sup. Ct. 446 (1900).4 1Schwertyer v. Bean, 154 Ark. 228, 242 S. W. 63 (1922); Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Marsh.
460, 22 Am. Dec. 41, 59 (Ky. 1831); see Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 569 (U. S. 1824).4 2Selle v. Rapp, 143 Ark. 192, 220 S. W. 662 (1920).
43 See ATKINSON, WrLns 432 (1937).
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Thus, the decree of decedent's domicile as to the validity of a will is
followed elsewhere as a result of comity only, not because it is con-
clusive everywhere."
d. Rem and Quasi-in-rem. Courts have distinguished between ac-
tions that affect the interests in the property of all persons, whether
known or unknown, and actions that affect only the interests in the prop-
erty of designated persons.45 The first of these, actions against the in-
terests of everyone, are called actions in rem; the latter, actions against
the interests of designated persons, are called actions quasi-in-rem.
The distinction between actions in rem and actions quasi-in-rem has
been confused at times because courts and legal writers have not been
too careful in defining the property subject to the jurisdiction of the
court. Thus, probate proceedings are, at times, called quasi-in-rem be-
cause the decedent may have owned property in common with anothei
and only the decedent's part could be administered by the probate court.
But, probate proceedings are actually in rem. The property subject to
the court's jurisdiction is only the decedent's estate, and the proceeding
is to affect the claims of all heirs, devisees, and legatees, whether known
or unknown.
Whenever a proceeding will bar unknown claimants, it is in rem. Thus,
quiet title actions may be in rem or quasi-in-rem. If the proceeding is
to determine the interests of all persons in the property it is in rem. If
the proceeding is to determine the validity of the claim of a certain per-
son, it is quasi-in-rem.
Proceedings for forfeitures may be either in rem or quasi-in-rem, de-
pending on the statute. When the interests of all persons are cut off,
whether innocent or not, the action is in rem.4 6 But statutes may pro-
vide for only the forfeiture of the interests of guilty parties, who would
necessarily be designated. The action would then be quasi-in-rem. 7
Actions for specific performance or foreclosure of a mortgage are
usually quasi-in-rem because the vendor or mortgagor are designated
persons.48 But, even these actions could be in rem as the question of the
interests of unknown heirs could arise as a result of the death of the
vendor or mortgagor.49
44See Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Co., 242 U. S. 394, 400, 37 Sup. Ct. 152, 155 (1917);
GoODUICH, CoNNILcr ol LAWS 454-456 (1938). At common law the rule was expressed
differently--decedent's personalty was deemed to be at decedent's domicile.4 5Freeman v Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165 (1886); see 3 FREEmAN, JUDG-
MNTS § 1522 (5th ed. Tuttle 1925).4 6Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 465, 47 Sup. Ct. 133 (1926).
47Day v. Micou. 18 Wall. 156 (U. S. 1873); see U. S. v. One 1936 Model Ford Coach,
307 U. S. 219, 59 Sup. Ct. 861 (1939).4 8 Georgia Casualty Co. v. O'Donnell, 109 Fla. 290, 147 So. 267 (1933) (mortgage fore-
closure).49 Simmons v. Fry, 8 Mackey 472 (D. C. 1890) (specific performance).
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Even actions involving choses-in-action, although usually quasi-in-
rem because the obligor and obligee are known, may be in rem. Actions
to condemn unclaimed bank deposits would be an example of this because
they would affect the interests of all possible claimants. 5
Actually actions quasi-in-rem are merely specialized types of actions
in rem, because the court proceeds against the property itself and juris-
diction is based on jurisdiction over property, not over a person.5 For
that reason, courts and legislatures are not too careful in their use of
these terms; they frequently describe an action as in rem when more
specifically it could be described as quasi-in-rem. 5
II. Acquisition of Jurisdiction
For a court to act in rem it must have jurisdiction over the res. Cer-
tain steps in the acquisition of jurisdiction are mandatory in all states,
being required by due process. These will be discussed here. States may
require by statute more steps than are required by due process, but these
additional requirements vary so greatly from state to state that it is
practically impossible to deduce from them any general rule on the sub-
ject.53 For a court to have jurisdiction, due process requires that the
court have control over the res, that notice be given to persons whose
interests are to be so affected, and that a hearing must be granted.
a. Control over the Res. Since actions in rem are derived from the
principle that a state can determine the title or status of property within
its borders, for a court to act in rem the res must be within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the court. 4 This necessitates the determination of
the location or situs of property. For tangible property this presents
no problem. The situs of rights to or interests in tangible property is
the situs of the property burdened or the place where the right is exer-
cised, not the situs of the property benefited.55 Intangible property is
more difficult as it has no actual situs, only a legal situs. This legal situs
has been held to be at the domicile of the obligor or wherever he may
5OSee note 28 supra.5 1Day v. Micou, 18 Wall. 156 (U. S. 1873). The name quasi-in-rem is erroneous because
these actions are not just similar to actions in rem but they are actions in rem. See Cook,
Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoL. L. Rav. 37, 47 (1915).5 2 Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 88 Pac. 356, 359 (1906);
Dulin v. McCaw, 39 W. Va. 721, 724, 20 S. E. 681, 684 (1894).
SsThe problem is even further complicated by the fact that all statutory requirements
may not be jurisdictional. See Bank of Colfax v. Richardson, 34 Ore. 518, 526, 54 Pac.
359, 364 (1899).
5 4 Montrose Pickle Co. v. Dodson Mfg. Co., 76 Iowa 172, 40 N. W. 709 (1888); Bates
v. Chic. M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 66 Wis. 296, 19 N. W. 72 (1884); First National Bank v.
Smith, 80 W. Va. 678, 93 S. E. 755 (1917).55See note 25 supra.
1948]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
be found and subjected to jurisdiction in personam."6 But the obligor
may not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a court5 In cases
where an instrument may be the res, the actual location of the instrument
is controlling, not the situs of the property or the right it represents.5 8
There are statements that indicate that in addition to having the prop-
erty within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, seizure or acts of
equivalent import are necessary to bring the property within the con-
trol of the court. 9 Seizure means that the sheriff must take possession
of the property and either personally keep it or entrust it to a bailee. In
the case of land, the seizure is usually only constructive, consisting of
filing a writ with some public official."0 Acts that have been held to be
of equivalent import are enjoining the transfer of the res,6" the appoint-
ment of a receiver, 2 and the service of process on a third person having
possession of the res as a trustee or bailee.'
Most of the statements that indicate that seizure is necessary for juris-
diction in rem do not indicate whether seizure is necessary to satisfy stat-
utory jurisdictional requirements or the requirements of due process.
Moreover, those statements that do indicate that seizure is necessary
for due process are usually dictum. For many types of proceedings it
has been held that no seizure is necessary. Thus, no seizure is necessary
if the proceeding is in equity,64 or in probate, or if it is to foreclose an
existing lien on the property,65 or if the property is in the possession of
the plaintiff,6" or if the court could at any time take custody of the prop-
erty.6
7
In fact, there are fairly definite statements that seizure of the res is
never required by due process. In Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Regis-
tration,6 where the object of the action was realty Chief Justice Holmes
5 6 Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904); Chic. R. I. and Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (1899). Originally it was believed that a court had
no jurisdiction for garnishment if the obligation was due by one foreigner to another for-
eigner. Tingley V. Batemen, 10 Mass. 343 (1813).5 7First National Bank v. Smith, 80 W. Va. 678, 93 S. E. 755 (1917).
58Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 2d 1926); Venus Foods v. District Court,
- Idaho -, 181 P. 2d 775 (1947); First Trust Co. v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N. W.
1 (1932).5 9 Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282 (1917).6
oSee Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308, 317 (U. S. 1870).6 1Pennington v. Fourth National Bank, 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup. Ct. 282 (1917); Benner
v. Benner, 63 Ohio St. 220, 58 N. E. 569 (1900).6 2State v. Ninth Judicial District Court, 50 Nev. 382, 257 Pac. 831 (1927); cf. Nichols
v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 589, 36 P. 2d 380 (1934).
63 Clark v. Clark, 202 Ind. 104, 172 N. E. 124 (1930); Zuhlke v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
244 App. Div. 549, 279 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1935).64 Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294, 5 Sup. Ct. 135 (1884).65 See Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 405, 20 Sup. Ct. 410, 412 (1900). ,
6 6 Clossan v. Clossan, 30 Wyo. 1, 215 Pac. 485 (1923); Bernhardt v. Brown, 118 N. C.
706, 24 S. E. 528 (1890).
67See note 26 supra.
68175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 814 (1908).
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stated, "However this may be, when we come to deal with immovables,
there would be no sense whatever in declaring seizure to be a constitu-
tional condition of the power of the legislature to make a proceeding in
rem.... When it is considered how purely formal such an act may be,
... I cannot think that the presence or absence of the form makes a con-
stitutional difference." The U. S. Supreme Court expressed similar sen-
timents in Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil-Cloth Co.69 "In such cases the land
itself must be drawn within the jurisdiction of the court by some asser-
tion of its control and power over it. This, as we have seen, is ordinarily
done by actual seizure, but may be done by the mere bringing of the
suit in which the claim is sought to be enforced, which may by law be
equivalent to a seizure, being the open and public exercise of dominion
over it for the purposes of the suit."70
The same rule should apply to chattels because courts have the same
power over chattels as they do over immovables. The statements are,
however, more persistent that seizure of a chattel is necessary. But
again the statements do not clearly indicate that seizure is required by
due process.
Seizure of chattels was required at common law and is now required
by most state statutes for an attachment. But why is seizure necessary,
is it to protect the owner of the property? The purpose is usually two
fold, to assure that the chattel is kept within the territorial jurisdiction
pending determination of the action71 and to give the attaching creditor
rights in the chattel prior to those of other creditors or purchasers.72 The
owner of property cannot claim that there has been a denial of due
process even though there has been no seizure. In Gallum v. Weil 3 the
court held, ". . . seizure of property under a writ of attachment is not
necessary to the jurisdiction of the court over the same or authority for
service of summons upon the defendant by publication. It is sufficient if
it be made to appear by the complaint or the affidavit for the order of
publication that the defendant has property in this state which can be
reached by proceeding to enforce the judgment in case one is rendered.
The statutory requisites for an order of service by publication do not
include seizure of property or any use of the provisional remedy by at-
tachment proceedings. Attention has been many times called to that by
this court, though a seizure of property is commonly supposed to be neces-
69112 U. S. 294, 302, 5 Sup. Ct. 135, 138 (1884).
7
oSee also Allen v. Allen, 126 Ark. 164, 189 S. W. 841 (1916) ; Forrester v. Forrester, 155
Ga. 722, 118 S. E. 373 (1923); Reed v. Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188, 167 N. E. 684 (1929);
Wilder v. Wilder, 93 Vt. 105, 106 AUt. 562 (1919); cf. Blackington v. Blackington, 141
Mass. 423, 5 N. E. 830 (1886).7 1See note 4 supra.72 Gallum v. Weil, 116 Wis. 236, 92 N. W. 1091 (1903).
13116 Wis. 236, 242, 92 N. W. 1091, 1093 (1903).
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sary because that method of proceeding is the usual and probably the
only one to efficiently guard the interests of the plaintiff."'4 In this case
there was no seizure of the property but there was notice to its owner.
This case is to be distinguished from Pennoyer v. Neff75 where there was
neither seizure nor notice. Thus, the rule for chattels is the same as
the rule for immovables; seizure is not required by due process.
If the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, notice,
not seizure, is the important requirement of due process. But notice that
a proceeding is pending is not enough; the notice must indicate specifi-
cally that certain property is involved, and is to be charged with any
judgment for the plaintiff.7
Not requiring seizure of tangible property for actions in rem is in
accord with the basic principles of such actions. A state has power
over all the property within its borders without seizure. Moreover, seizure
is unnecessary to protect persons with an interest in the property. Notice
and hearing effectively accomplish that.
Where the res is intangible no question of its seizure arises. As stated
previously, to obtain jurisdiction over intangibles the court must have
jurisdiction over the obligor obtained by personal service.
b. Notice. Notice in actions in rem is to be distinguished from ser-
vice of process in actions in personam because notice may be given a
person even though he is outside the territorial limits of the court, since
jurisdiction over the person is not necessary in actions in rem. The
notice must indicate that there is a proceeding involving certain prop-
erty, the nature of the proceeding, whose interests are to be affected,
and the time and place of the hearing. Due process does not require any
special form of notice. Anything that reasonably conveys the informa-
tion may be used. In some cases, as in actions for specific performance
or actions quasi-in-rem to quiet title, this information is contained in the
pleadings.77 In some other cases notice is given by writ of attachment or
by a similar form. There may even be errors on the notice, as the mis-
spelling of a name, if the resulting notice adequately advises persons of
the proceeding."
Whether the persons whose interests are to be affected must be named
in the notice depends on the nature of the action and on whether or not
7 41talics added. See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 274, 16 Sup. Ct. 585, 392 (1896).
7595 U. S. 727 (1877).7 6Wesner v. O'Brien, 56 Kan. 724, 44 Pac. 1090 (1896); Reed v. Reed, 121 Ohio St. 188,
167 N. E. 684 (1929); Beyer v. Investors' Syndicate, 47 N. D. 358, 182 N. W. 934, 938
(1921) (concurring opinion of Judge Birdzell).7 7See note 76 supra. This is why no seizure is necessary in equity actions.
78Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 34 Sup. Ct. 779 (1914); cf. Meyer v. Kuhn, 63 Fed.
703 (C. C. A. 4th 1893).
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the person is known. In cases where the government is proceeding against
property for public purposes, as where land is being sold for taxes, de-
scribing the property is sufficient."9 Persons who are known to have
interests in the property do not have to be named. Where the action is
brought by a private person, as actions to quiet title, known claimants
must be designated by name, whether the action be quasi-in-rem or in
rem. Their interests cannot be affected by a notice that indicates only
a proceeding against unknown claimants.80 Interests of unknown claim-
ants cannot be affected unless the notice indicates that the proceed-
ing is against unknown claimants. 1
This distinction between actions by the government and actions by
private litigants is not justified. Notice is necessary to advise a per-
son whose interests are affected about the proceeding. Therefore, what
is reasonable to advise him should not depend on the kind of plaintiff
or the nature of the proceeding. Moreover, governmental activities
would not be hampered by requiring a government, when plaintiff, to
follow the rule applied to private litigants, as only known claimants
would have to be included in the notice, and errors in making the assess-
ment would not vitiate any proceedings taken under it. 2 To take the
rule that errors made in assessing property will not vitiate the assess-
ment and extend it to hold that it is unnecessary to name known claim-
ants, as was done in the case of Castillo v. McComnicoas is not justified.84
It is recognized that distinctions may be made between these two types
of proceedings, but it is not believed that that justifies not indicating
the names of known claimants to land that is the object of an action
by the government. Even though taxes were levied and land sold in an
administrative proceeding, due process would still require adequate
notice to persons whose interests were affected.'
Various methods of delivering the notice are permissible under due
process. It may be delivered personally, mailed, or even published in
a newspaper or on a courthouse bulletin board. But receipt of the notice
is not required.8" It is believed that this is in accord with the basic prin-
7 9Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. 229 (1898).86Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 443 (1914); Meyer v. Kuhn, 65 Fed.
705 (C. C. A. 4th 1895) ; see Hill v. Henry, 66- N. J. Eq. 150, 57 AtI. 554 (1904).
B1Savage v. Gray, 96 Me. 557, 53 Ati. 61 (1902); cf. Thomas v. Myers, 193 P. 2d 624
(N. Mex. 1948).8 2 Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (U. S. 1866).
83168 U. S. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. 229 (1898).
8 4In Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 62, 40 Sup. Ct. 62, 64 (1919), the statute provided
that if the claimant was not present at the hearing he should "be notified thereof in writ-
ing." Yet in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276, 285, 45 Sup. Ct. 491, 495
(1925), the Bragg case is cited for the proposition, "that in proceedings for the condemna-
tion of property for public use, notice by publication is constitutionally sufficient."85 Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 Sup. Ct. 390 (1904).
86See note 4 supra.
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ciples of actions in rem. Though the exercise of the state's power over
property within its borders can be postponed pending a reasonable
effort to give notice, it cannot be completely frustrated where giving such
notice is impossible. Mr. Justice Bradley in the Case of Broderick's Will 7
pointedly stated, "The world must move on, and those who claim an in-
terest in persons or things must be charged with knowledge of their
status and condition, and of the vicissitudes to which they are subject.
This is the foundation of all judicial proceedings in rem."
Whether notice by publication"8 satisfies due process has been ques-
tioned many times. For such notice to satisfy the requirements of due
process it must have been specifically authorized by statute.8 9 If the inter-
ests of unknown claimants are involved, publication is the only possible
way of giving them notice. If a claimant and his address are known,
a choice of methods of delivering the notice is available. If a known
claimant is a non-resident, the U. S. Supreme Court has upheld notice
by publication in actions both in rem and quasi-in-rem without even dis-
cussing whether it was the means most likely to give knowledge of the
proceedings.' When the claimant is a resident and the action is quasi-
in-rem notice by publication has been upheld only if his address is
unknown.9 If the action is one by the government for public purposes
even though there be a resident claimant, notice by publication is per-
missible. 2 If the action is by a private litigant and in rem, notice by
publication is necessary for unknown claimants. There is no case de-
ciding whether a different method of delivery must be used for known
claimants who are residents. Justice Holmes in Tyler v. Judges of the
Court of Registration indicated that notice by publication would be ap-
propriate for all claimants because, "it hardly would do to make a dis-
tinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is a
bar to all."93 However, the reasoning used here has not been approved
by the U. S. Supreme Court because it has distinguished between known
and unknown claimants when considering whether names of claimants
should be indicated in a notice. Even though the action is strictly in rem,
8721 Wall. 503, 509 (U. S. 1874).
8aSince jurisdiction in personam can also be obtained by publication, it is believed that
confusion would be avoided if the phrase service by publication were limited to actions
in personam and the phrase notice by publication used for actions in rem.8 9 Compare Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557 (1890) with Hart v. Samson,
110 U. S. 151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586 (1884).9 OArndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557 (1890); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and
Imp. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 Sup. Ct. 603 (1889).
91Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 32 Sup. Ct. 303 (1912).9 2Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79, 24 Sup. Ct. 390 (1904); Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S.
674, 18 Sup. Ct. 229 (1898).
93175 Mass. 71, 75, 55 N. E. 812, 813 (1900).
[Vol. 34
ACTIONS IN REM
if there is a known resident claimant notice by publication should be held
insufficient. In Hamilton.v. Brown94 the court stated, "But it was within
the power of the legislature of Texas to provide for determining and
quieting the title to real estate within the limits of the State and within
the jurisdiction of the court, after actual notice to all known claimants,
and notice by publication to all other persons."
When a claimant's address is known, whether he be a resident or a
non-resident, courts should insist that the notice be delivered by what-
ever means is the most likely to give actual knowledge of the proceeding.
The court should decide whether notice by publication is as desirable
a method of giving notice as mail or personal delivery. This is the test
laid down by the U. S. Supreme Court when considering substituted ser-
vice in actions in personam, "To dispense with personal service the
substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that
ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done." 5 Most courts
do not follow this in actions in rem. They decide simply whether the
method used was reasonable, not whether it was the most reasonble
method. One court has, however, pointed the way. In People v. One
1941 Chrysler 6 Touring Sedan 6 a California court stated, "Due process
is a variable concept. Whether it has been violated depends upon the
facts of the case. Where alternatives are given it requires that that
alternative reasonably calculated to notify the person affected be used."
To insist on the method of delivery that would most likely reach per-
sons whose interests are involved would not interfere with a state's exer-
cise of its power over property and would further effectuate the second
basic principle of actions in rem by giving greater protection to persons
affected. This might require that in actions in rem notice be given by
publication to unknown claimants and another way to known claimants,
but it is believed that there is nothing unconstitutional about this.
To distinguish between actions by the government and private liti-
gants or residents and non-residents as to the method of delivering
notice is not justified. The objection to distinguishing between the gov-
ernment and private litigants was discussed during the consideration of
vfhether the names of claimants had to be given in the notice. Every-
thing said then applies as well to the question of method of delivering
the notice. The distinction between residents and non-residents is not
justified because actions in rem are based on power over property and
not on the residence of persons with an interest in the property. Non-
residents have as much right to protect their interests as residents, and
94161 U. S. 256, 274, 16 Sup. Ct. 585, 592 (1896).
95 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 92, 37 Sup. Ct. 343, 344 (1917).
98180 P. 2d 780, 788, rehearing 183 P. 2d 368, 378 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1947).
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therefore, as much right to the most reasonable method of delivery of
notice as do residents. Here is one place where it would hardly do to make
a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants, to use Justice
Holmes' phrase.
In considering the most reasonable method of delivering notice it must
be remembered ". . .'that service of process by newspaper publication
is allowed as of necessity. It is due process of law more in form than
substance. However convenient, it is a harsh and highly technical sub-
stitution for service of process .... "" Where notice by publication is
permitted, statutes usually require that the publication be made in the
county where the res is. However, in Security Bank v. California8 the
U. S. Supreme Court held that publication in another county, here the
one in which the state capitol was located, was in accord with due piocess.
Another typical requirement of statutes when notice by publication is
permitted is that there be an affidavit of non-residence or that personal
service is impossible. In the same case, Security Bank v. California, the
court held that such a requirement was not constitutionally indispensable.
In garnishment proceedings service of process on the garnishee is suffi-
dent. This is deemed notice to the person whose debt was garnished.
No actual notice need be given by either the plaintiff or the garnishee."
Notice that there is a proceeding involving property may be given by
seizure of property.' 0 Thus seizure, although not necessary to bring the
property under the control of the court, is one effective means of giving
notice that there is an action pending involving the property. It oper-
ates as notice to all persons that the property has been taken into the
custody of the court. But seizure will not satisfy all the requirements
of notice, as it cannot supply the necessary information about the hear-
ing. "A sentence rendered simply from the fact of seizure would not be
a judicial determination of the question of forfeiture, but a mere arbi-
trary edict of the judicial officer.... The jurisdiction acquired by the
seizure is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to
pass upon that question after opportunity has been afforded to its owner
and parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges. To
this end some notification of the proceedings beyond that arising from
the seizure, prescribing the time within which the appearance must be
made, is essential."''
When written notice is used instead of seizure, it must describe the
9 7Stanton v. Thompson, 234 Mo. 7, 136 S. W. 698, 699 (1911).
98263 U. S. 282, 289, 44 Sup. CL 108, 111 (1923).
9 9 Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Hosteller, 240 U. S. 620, 36 Sup. CL 475 (1916).
1'OCooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (U. S. 1870).
101 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 277 (1876); see Scott v. McNeil, 154 U. S. 34,
14 Sup. CL 1108 (1894); The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (U. S. 1815).
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property involved with such certainty that a person can tell whether it
is his; property not described is not affected by a decree.1 2
However, this does not apply to probate proceedings unless some
phase of the proceedings concerns specific property when it may be neces-
sary to describe the property.
c. Other Requirements. In addition to control over the res and notice,
a hearing is required for due process; for unless a party has a chance to be
heard, the notice itself loses all value.' Also, sufficient time must allowed
between the giving of the notice and the hearing to allow a party to
appear and answer."0 4 What is a reasonable time depends on the distance
between the place of receipt of notice and the place of the hearing. If an
interested person cannot appear because he has been forced to leave the
country, the proceeding is void as to him."° This is to be distinguished
from the situation where an interested party voluntarily leaves the juris-
diction.'1° If a party does attempt to appear and answer but is prevented
by the court, the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the case.
It was stated that the court's jurisdiction must be invoked by appro-
priate pleadings. Any form of pleading prescribed by the state would
constitute due process unless it failed to give persons notice of the nature
of the action.
There are a few special types of proceedings where requirements that
are in addition to the ones already discussed are made necessary by due
process. Probate proceedings are examples of this. For a court to have
jurisdiction, the person whose estate is being probated must be de-
ceased.'07
III. Judgments In Rem and Quasi-In-Rem
In determining the effect of judgments, one fundamental principle must
be remembered-that a court conclusively determines the title, status,
or liability of whatever was subject to the court's jurisdiction. Thus, if
a court has jurisdiction in personam the judgment conclusively deter-
mines the liabilities or right to act of the defendant. If the court has
jurisdiction in rem, the judgment conclusively determines the title or
status of the res. "In what has been called their 'legislative' effect there
is no substantial difference between judgments in rem and in per-
sonam." 08 But there are other differences between judgments in rem
and judgments in personam which should be recognized.
'
0 2 Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336 (U. S. 1850).
103 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 (1876).
'
0 4 Rolher v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398, 20 Sup. Ct. 410 (1900); see Wick v. Chelan Electric
Co., 280 U. S. 108, 50 Sup. Ct. 41 (1929).0 5 Dean v. Nelson, 10 Wall. 158 (U. S. 1869).
10 6Dudlow v. Ramsey, 11 Wall. 581 (U. S. 1870).
1 0 7Scott v. McNeil, 154 U. S. 34, 14 Sup. Ct. 1108 (1894).
1083 FRE mm, JuDmwNs 3115 (5th ed. Tuttle 1925).
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Judgments in personam determine the rights and duties of a person,
even subjecting him to a personal liability, but they affect only the per-
son subject to the court's jurisdiction. Judgments in rem determine the
title or status of property subject to the court's jurisdiction. In acting
on property, judgments in rem affect persons by determining their right
to or interest in property. This is the limit of their effect on persons how-
ever; they cannot subject anyone to a personal liability, not even for
costs." 9 A person may even appear specially to protect his property and
not be bound in personam."0 Of course, courts may give judgments that
are effective both in rem and in personam if the court has both in rem and
in personam jurisdiction."'
Just as actions may be divided into actions strictly in rem and actions
quasi-in-rem, so may judgments. If the action was against the interests
in property of designated persons, the judgment would affect the inter-
ests of only those persons and would be quasi-in-rem.112 If the action is
against the interests in the property of all persons, the resulting deter-
mination will be conclusive as to all persons, and would be in rem. Every-
body in the world is bound by the title or status of the property as deter-
mined by a judgment in rem,n 8 including not only persons sui juris,
but also persons non compos mentis, infants, and persons under other
legal disabilities unless they are exempted by statute." 4
Because judgments in actions where the court is exercising jurisdiction
over status have this effect, they have frequently been called in rem.
However, the U. S. Supreme Court indicated that a distinction should
be made between judgments in rem and judgments in actions, as to status,
even though it recognized the similarity, when it stated that a divorce
decree partakes of some of the characteristics of a decree in rem." 5
Although the decree as to the title or status of the res which is subject
to the jurisdiction of the court is conclusive on both the property and
the persons whose interests were affected, findings of fact or holdings
on issues litigated are distinguishable, being conclusive only so far as
the property itself is concerned. Justice Holmes in Brigham v. Fayer-
weather'" stated, "And it does not follow in the former case [a judg-
ment in rem] any more than in the latter [a judgment in personam], nor
0 9Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165 (1886); see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U. S. 714, 723 (1877).
110 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (C. C. A. 6th
1922).
'
1 1 See note 8 supra.1 12 Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165 (1886).1 1 3Woodruf v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 (1847).
114Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 179, 5 Sup. Ct. 407 (1885); Goodrich v. Thompson, 19
Fla. 327, 118 So. 60 (1928).
115Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 232, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1945).
116140 Mass. 411, 5 N. E. 265, 266 (1886).
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is it true, that the judgment, because conclusive on all the world in what
we may call its legislative effect, is equally conclusive upon all as an
adjudication of the facts upon which it is grounded.... We may lay on
one side, then, any argument based on the misleading expression that
all the world are parties to a proceeding in rem. This does not mean
that all the world are entitled to be heard; and, as strangers in interest
are not entitled to be heard, there is no reason why they should be bound
by the findings of fact, although bound to admit the title or status which
the judgment establishes."
Even plaintiffs and persons who had a right to appear because their
interests were affected are not bound in later actions by any findings of
fact or holdings made in an action in rem, even though issues specifically
litigated therein should arise again, if in the later action the court has
jurisdiction in personam or jurisdiction over different property. It was
indicated earlier that any issues might be litigated or any relief given in
an action in rem if the holding on the issue or the relief given affected
the res. The holding on issues litigated and the relief given are effective
only for the purpose of determining the title or status of the property and
have no effect on the personal rights between the parties.
Plaintiffs in actions in rem whose claims had not been completely satis-
fied by the in rem action can bring a second action, but they would have
to relitigate their claim completely. They could not use the judgment in
the in rem action as the basis of the second action. Thus, if an action
is brought against a non-resident for a debt when jurisdiction is based
on attachment of the non-resident's property, and if a judgment is ob-
tained that is only partially satisfied from the property attached, a second
action may be brought, but on the original claim.1 ' Or, if a contract
provides for the sale of two tracts of land, each in a different jurisdic-
tion, and if the vendee should sue in one in an action based on jurisdic-
tion over the tract there, the vendee would not be affected by any judg-
ment rendered should he later sue for the second tract in an action either
in rem based on jurisdiction over the second tract or in personam 1 8
Similarly, persons whose interests in property are affected by actions
in rem are not concluded by the judgment in rem should they sue the
person who was plaintiff in the in rem action on some issue litigated in
that action. Thus, if a vendor should have the interests in property
created by a land sale contract with a non-resident vendee terminated
in an action based on jurisdiction over the land under contract, the
vendor might still be liable to the vendee in an- action in personam. The
117 Toby v. Brown, 11 Ark. 308 (1850); Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass
14, 112 N. E. 50 (1916).
118 Van Horst v. Thompson, 18 F. 2d 177 (App. D. C. 1927).
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action in rem would terminate the vendee's interest in the land but not
his personal rights against the vendor. Also, the vendor may still sue
the vendee for any damages he has sustained." 9 Similarly, when a court
grants interpleader on the basis of jurisdiction- over the res, and perhaps
over one claimant, the decree will be conclusive on all claimants as to
the title or right to possession of the res. But any claimant who was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court will not be prevented from as-
serting any claims he may have against the stakeholder12 0 Decrees in
hybrid class actions have a similar effect, they are conclusive as to the
res but not as to the personal rights of persons not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the court. 2'
Garnishees must be distinguished from plaintiffs. A determination of
the liability of a garnishee in an action quasi-in-rem is conclusive, so that
he is protected in a later action by his creditor. 22 However, the creditor
may still sue the plaintiff if the garnishment was improper; his personal
rights are protected to that extent.'2
In discussing the conclusive effect of judgments in rem it should be
remembered that they are as subject to attack as are judgments in per-
sonam for fraud or lack of jurisdiction. However, they also benefit from
the same presumptions as to jurisdiction. 24
Conclusion
It has been shown how the principle that a state has power to deter-
mine the status or title of property within its borders has been used by
courts to permit all types of actions against property and rights in prop-
erty and even against intangible interests. But it has also been shown
that persons whose interests are affected are not at the complete mercy
of a state. Most of the problems in the field of actions in rein concern
methods of protecting persons who have interests in the property in-
volved. Also, most of the possibility for improving the applicable laws
concern the same subject.
Protection is provided persons whose interests are affected by the re-
quirements for notice and hearing. Protection is also provided by the
rules that issues litigated in actions in rem must affect the res and that
in determining the title or status of the res the court does not affect
rights or liabilities between parties. Another protection to persons is
1 9See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S. C. 496, 498, 11 S. E. 63, 64 (1930).
12'Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160 (1887).
121 See 2 MOORE AND FREDM.A, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2292 (1938).1 22Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1904).
'22Anderson v. Canaday, 37 Okla. 171, 131 Pac. 697 (1913).
12 4Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 87 S. W. 2d 6 (1935).
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provided by those courts that hold that a plaintiff cannot make his own
liabilities a res or garnish himself.
It is believed, however, that further protection should be afforded per-
sons with interests in property subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
The rules as to the method of giving notice should be changed so that
the most reasonable method would be required. Also, more use should
be made of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Not only would these
changes afford necessary additional protection to persons affected by
actions in rem, but they could be made without hampering the power of
a state over property.
